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Book Reviews 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILffiES. By Leon Trakman1 
and Sean Gatien.2 University of Toronto Press. 1999. Pp. 
286. $24.95. 
Evan Tsen Lee3 
There is a widespread perception that America is obsessed 
with rights. Leftists and conservatives both decry a culture 
whose first instinct in solving any social problem is the assertion 
of a right.4 Left academics lament the system's reliance on the 
concept of rights to protect or advance the social and economic 
welfare of the oppressed.5 The assertion of rights, they say, is 
"alienating. "6 Social conservatives want America to turn to the 
nuclear family, the church, and the local school board as means 
of settling disagreements about values.7 Both Left and Right call 
for revitalizing a strong form of community; never mind that 
each's vision of community may be the other's worst nightmare.8 
But rights discourse is proving remarkably resistant to criti-
cism from both sides. It runs deep in our legal culture, and nei-
1. Bora Laskin National Fellow and Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School. 
2. Research Associate, Dalhousie University. 
3. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
4. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Dis-
course (Free Press, 1991). 
5. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984). 
6. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of 
the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563, 1566-69 (1984). 
7. See, e.g., Morton M. Kondracke, Bush Will Fight 'Culture Wars'-But 'Posi-
tively,' Roll Call (Oct. 21, 1999), available in LEXIS, News Library, Roll Call File (Gov-
ernor George W. Bush advocating the bolstering of the role of schools, parents, and 
churches in inculcating values); Candidate-by-Candidate Look at Personal Beliefs, Com-
ments, USA Today (Sept. 10, 1999), available in LEXIS, News Library, USA Today File 
(former Vice-President Dan Quayle arguing that schools should strengthen "character 
education" programs, starting with the Ten Commandments). 
8. Contrast Alasdair Macintyre, After Vinue: A Study in Moral Theory (U. Notre 
Dame Press, 2d ed. 1984) (advocating an Aristotelian approach that rests heavily on tra-
dition) with Michael Walzer, Justice Here and Now, in Frank S. Lucash, ed., Justice and 
Equality Here and Now 136-150 (Cornell U. Press, 1986) (advocating programs requiring 
mass redistribution of wealth and political control). 
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ther side wants to forego its pet claims (rights to life, property 
and bear arms on the Right; rights to equality, reproductive 
freedom, and government entitlements on the Left). There is 
also the problem of what would replace the liberal, individual-
centered, state. To enforce community solidarity, we must have 
some kind of consensus about fundamental values, which would 
seem difficult to achieve in a nation of a quarter billion people 
descended from dozens of starkly different cultures. Then there 
are problems of implementation. America's public and private 
sectors are both largely predicated on the supposed incorrigibil-
ity of individual and group self-interest. Replacing the infra-
structure and language of the liberal, pluralist state would be a 
daunting task indeed. 
In Rights and Responsibilities, Leon Trakman and Sean 
Gatien announce from the start that they are not out to trash 
liberalism or its rights discourse.9 (p. xii) Rather, they seek to 
create some balance between individual freedoms and commu-
nity interests.10 (p. 20) Too often, they say, individual righthold-
ers are permitted to exercise their freedoms in a manner destruc-
tive of community interests-for example, by strip mining or 
clear cutting forests. When by chance another party can assert a 
countervailing legal right, the court may actually stop the first 
rightholder from acting in such a destructive manner. But if no 
such countervailing right exists, the courts are powerless to stop 
the destruction. 
So existing rights jurisprudence is deficient because it falls 
short of protecting vital community interests against individual 
rightholders' destructive acts. There aren't sufficient external 
impediments to the exercise of rights- such as countervailing 
rights-to guard these vital community assets. What we need, 
say Trakman and Gatien, are internal restrictions on the exercise 
of rights. Such internal restrictions would not be dependent on 
the inclination or ability of others to come forward and demon-
strate countervailing rights. They would, as popular saying has 
it, come with the territory. Trakman and Gatien call these inter-
nal restrictions "responsibilities" and explain the concept as fol-
lows: 
9. The authors state, "[our] aim is to enrich liberalism, not undermine it." (p. xli) 
10. The authors criticize both Michael Sandel's communitarianism and John 
Rawls's liberalism on the ground that "[b]oth fail to balance important individual and 
social values by insisting upon the priority of either the right or the good." (p. 20) 
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If the prima facie right is not overridden by external limits, but 
is shown to have a sufficiently probable and proximate impact 
that is detrimental to sufficiently important interests, then an 
internal limit or responsibility is imposed upon the exercise of 
rights that limits or nullifies these effects. For example, if the 
exercise of a mining right gives rise to pollution, that right is 
subject to internal limits that restrict it and, in extreme cases, 
prohibit its exercise.11 (p. 65) 
419 
To take one of Trakman and Gatien's more specific exam-
ples, let us suppose that an oil company wishes to explore for oil 
on land that it owns. Further suppose that Native peoples claim 
that the exploration will disrupt or destroy their traditional or 
historical preservation and use of the land. To the degree that 
the Native peoples cannot assert their own legal rights against 
the proposed exploration, the courts must determine whether 
the oil company nonetheless owes certain responsibilities to the 
Native peoples, such as consulting with them, ascertaining the 
precise impact of the exploration on their way of life, and per-
haps modifying the exploration to minimize such disruption or to 
compensate them for it. (pp. 195-96) 
It is not clear where Trakman and Gatien find theoretical 
justification for the recognition and enforcement of such internal 
limits on the exercise of rights. The reader is left to think that 
the justification is simple fairness. "If an individual right serves 
as a trump over the interests of others ... then that individual 
incurs a responsibility toward those others." (p. 13) The authors 
also seem to suggest that the justification for recognizing respon-
sibilities is the need to maintain a balance between individual 
and community interests. Trakman and Gatien compare their 
approach to that of equity jurisprudence. "This new equity," 
they say, "transcends limitations in the law by superseding ali-or-
nothing choices between harsh common-law remedies and equi-
table interests that neuter rights." (pp. 62-63) Indeed, Trakman 
and Gatien go so far as to claim that, by imposing responsibilities 
on the exercise of individual rights, liberty itself is enhanced: 
"The benefit in protecting both individual and shared interests is 
the enhancement of liberty and of the common good."12 (p. 63) 
So their justification for enforcing responsibilities appears both 
deontological and consequentialist-fairness demands it, and it 
improves everyone's lot to boot. 
11. Emphasis in original. 
12. Emphasis in original. Footnote omitted. 
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Another claim that Trakman and Gatien make for their 
"transformative approach" to rights is that it avoids the error of 
establishing an ex ante priority of individual right over social 
good. "We orient justice around the ex post balancing of the in-
terests of individuals and communities," (p. 40) Trakman and 
Gatien explain. "Responsibilities are determined ex post in light 
of affected interests of both individuals and communities, not on 
the basis of an a priori ranking of first-order individual rights 
above second-order cultural interests." (p. 79) The authors do 
not say whether ex post really means ad hoc-one suspects that 
it does-nor do they venture any guesses about whether such a 
system would provide adequate notice to protect the reliance in-
terests of rightholders. 
Trakman and Gatien's most insistent claim, however, is that 
their proposal would reconstitute rather than overthrow the lib-
eral conception of rights.13 Subjecting rights to enforceable re-
sponsibilities does not repudiate liberalism or the notion of 
rights. It expands liberalism to make it more inclusive. It does 
not reject individual autonomy, but only the insistence that indi-
vidual autonomy be accorded a preferred position in relation to 
community interests. Trakman and Gatien portray their liberal-
ism as a balanced liberalism. 
Their approach should have enormous popular appeal. 
Who would gainsay the old aphorism that "with rights come re-
sponsibilities"? It is only common morality that those who wield 
power over others should do so in a considerate and responsible 
manner. Indeed, one can make a strong case that those who 
have the power to alter the conditions of others' lives stand in a 
moral fiduciary relationship with those others. 
But it is one thing to say that one's legal rights are qualified 
by moral responsibilities; it is quite another to say that they are 
encumbered by legally enforceable responsibilities. Once we 
cross over from moral suasion to legal enforceability, it is diffi-
cult to see how Trakman and Gatien's notion of a "responsibil-
ity" differs in any useful respect from either the narrowing of 
existing rights or the creation of new countervailing rights. 
Consider hate speech. Trakman and Gatien conclude that 
neo-Nazis or the KKK had a right to march in Skokie, Illinois 
(where many Jews, including Holocaust survivors, lived). (pp. 
13. See, e.g., p. 68 ("Modifying the structure of rights to encompass the wider inter-
ests of others, as proposed above, continues to preserve liberal values."). 
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115-16) But they stress that the KKK had a responsibility to 
submit to regulations governing orderly conduct, which pre-
sumably means not inciting a riot. If the argument were that the 
KKK had a moral responsibility not to bait the locals, then 
Trakman and Gatien truly would be saying something that can-
not entirely be captured by the language of legal rights. The 
moral constraint on the KKK is qualitatively different than any 
legal constraint. But their argument is that the KKK has a le-
gally enforceable responsibility not to engage in incendiary be-
havior. How is that any different from saying either that the 
KKK has no legal right to engage in incendiary behavior, or that 
the locals have a right not to be baited that way? If there is any 
difference, Trakman and Gatien do not explain it. 
For the same reason, it is unclear why Trakman and Gatien 
think that their distinction between "internal" and "external" re-
straints has any significance. They claim that external restraints 
do not always get the job done, as in the protection of important 
Native and aboriginal interests. The law simply does not recog-
nize enough legal rights on the part of Native and aboriginal 
tribes. So Trakman and Gatien say that we ought to recognize 
responsibilities-internal restraints on property rightholders- to 
protect these interests. Yet they never explain why courts14 
would be inclined to see the situation differently once they view 
matters through the lens of internal responsibilities instead of 
through the lens of external rights. The problem here seems po-
litical rather than jurisprudential. If courts don't have the politi-
cal will or legitimate authority to create countervailing rights to 
protect Native and aboriginal interests in sacred burial grounds 
or fishing waters, what gives them the political will or legal 
authority to recognize legal responsibilities that have precisely 
the same effect-that is, to defeat the rights of property holders? 
Giving the players different names cannot change their capabili-
ties. 
This is a serious flaw. For the jurisprudential thread that 
holds this book together is the assertion that the distinct concept 
of "responsibilities" adds something to-indeed, rescues-rights 
discourse. Without that thread, the second half of the book 
reads much like a collection of position papers on hate speech, 
abortion, Native rights, and international environmental protec-
14. All their arguments seem addressed to courts rather than legislatures, agencies, 
or the general electorate. 
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tion.15 It becomes a manifesto for substantive centrism 16 on the 
major divisive social issues of our time, as well as a call for 
greater respect of Native, aboriginal, and environmental inter-
ests. On the merits, these positions are certainly plausible. But 
a jurisprudentially "transformative" approach to rights? No. 
Indeed, one must question the sincerity of the authors' 
claimed desire to reform rights jurisprudence rather than to de-
stroy it.17 Time and again Trakman and Gatien insist that the 
recognition of legally enforceable "responsibilities" would not 
defeat the notion of rights. On the surface, this claim looks cor-
rect: saying that one must exercise his right of free speech re-
sponsibly is hardly tantamount to saying that he has no right of 
free speech. The problem with this analysis is that it lumps dis-
crete activities together. Trakman and Gatien say that the KKK 
may march in Skokie, but they must do so in a responsible man-
ner, meaning that they may not bait Jews with epithets. Thus 
they characterize their position as preserving rights while intro-
ducing responsibilities, rather than as negating rights. But this 
misdescribes their position. Under their solution, the KKK re-
tains the right to march, but it has no right to hurl racist epithets 
while doing so. It is true that Trakman and Gatien are preserv-
ing one right, but it is equally true that they are denying another. 
As a matter of free speech doctrine, it is eminently sensible to 
say that the KKK ought have no right to bait Jews for the pur-
pose of provoking a riot, and therefore that the municipality of 
Skokie ought to have the power to prohibit such incitement. But 
one who holds this position ought to admit that he or she is de-
nying the KKK the right to engage in a particular activity and 
not simply requiring them to engage in some other activity "re-
sponsibly." 
15. The authors draw on their previous works in three of these four areas. See gen-
erally Leon E. Trakman, Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 Ohio 
St. L. J. 899 (1995); Leon E. Trakman and Sean Gatien, Abortion Rights: Taking Respon-
sibilities More Seriously Than Dworkin, 48 S.M.U. L. Rev. 585 (1995); Leon E. Trakman, 
Native Cultures in a Rights Empire: Ending the Dominion, 45 Buffalo L. Rev. 189 (1997). 
16. On abortion, for example, the authors conclude that women should not enjoy 
"unqualified reproductive autonomy," nor should fetuses enjoy "unconditional rights to 
life." They characterize thi~ as a "mediated discourse ... unlikely to appease steadfast 
pro-lifers and unfailing pro-choicers." (p. 163) 
17. The authors never let slip anything that makes them sound like true liberals, but 
they do occasionally say things that make them sound like unreconstructed communitari-
ans. See, e.g., p. 19 ("Our own keepers to be sure, we are also the keepers of our broth-
ers and sisters, neighbours and strangers, parents and children."). 
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All this follows from our conventional understanding of 
rights. As Ronald Dworkin has put it, a right is an individual 
"trump" over types of governmental justifications that may be 
urged on the community's behalf.18 That is to say, a right func-
tions much as would a thumb on the scales. Different interests 
have different trumping power.19 Some interests, such as the 
right to drive on public roads, have modest trumping power, and 
accordingly have been qualified in many respects. Others, such 
as the interest in not being tortured, approach absolute trumping 
power. To the degree that the individual interest is held to 
trump social interests, we say it is protected by a "right." When 
and to the degree that the trump disappears, so does the right. 
Trakman and Gatien either do not understand or accept this 
essential trumping quality of a right. Their confusion is laid bare 
in their critique of Charles Taylor's essay on multiculturalism: 
The problem with Taylor's approach is that it retains lib-
eral, exclusionary priorities. Despite the legal value that he 
accords cultural interests, he treats individual interests as 
first-order rights and cultural interests as second-order rights. 
He also structures cultural interests a priori so that individual 
rights always trump cultural rights. As a result, Taylor's right 
to cultural recognition is subservient to the prior right of indi-
viduals to be autonomous from that culture. 
Taylor's approach is only limitedly justifiable. It is justifi-
able for individual rights to trump cultural interests in some 
cases. But it is not justifiable to hold that this is necessarily so 
in all cases.w (pp. 78-79) 
Put to one side the fact that Charles Taylor is hardly a poster 
boy for atomistic liberalism.21 In this passage, Trakman and 
Gatien refuse to accept the conventional use of the term ''rights" 
to denote trumping power, instead urging that we reconceptual-
ize rights so as to make their weight contextual and contingent. 
My point is simply that, to the degree "rights" are shorn of their 
trumping power, they become mere "interests" subject to ordi-
18. Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights 
153 (Oxford U. Press, 1984) ("Rights are best understood as trumps over some back-
ground justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a 
whole.") (footnote omitted). I concede that my critique depends on Dworkin's concept 
of rights making sense. 
19. Id. at 92. 
20. Emphasis in original. Footnote omitted. 
21. Taylor's communitarian bent is made clear in Charles Taylor, The Nature and 
Scope of Distributive Justice, in Frank S. Lucash, ed., Justice and Equality: Here and Now 
at 34-67 (cited in note 8). 
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nary weighing in the decisional process. Of course we can re-
conceptualize "rights" in this fashion if we want-but we are 
then left with nothing other than non-deferential balancing of all 
interests, whether belonging to individuals or groups. This is not 
a new idea. 
Let us place this discussion back in the concrete free speech 
situation. When the courts hold that the KKK's interest in 
marching trumps the social interest in being free of public cele-
brations of hatred and intolerance, we say that the KKK has a 
"right" to march. When the courts hold that the KKK's interest 
in inciting riots does not trump the social interest in public 
safety, we say that the KKK has no right to incite riots. Trak-
man and Gatien hold just this position-that the KKK's interest 
in inciting riots does not trump social interests. They can call it a 
responsibility or anything else they like, but if they deny the 
trump, they deny the right. Granted, Trakman and Gatien are 
not attempting to eliminate all rights. They would leave many 
intact. But for every "responsibility" the courts enforce, a right 
is denied. It is disingenuous to suggest, as the authors do, that 
imposing responsibilities makes everybody a winner.22 (p. 63) 
Many on both the Left and Right preach that individuals 
must demonstrate greater responsibility to society. The interest 
pluralism of the New Deal and the Warren Court's enshrine-
ment of individual rights have left us in a relatively atomistic, of-
ten alienating world. Scholars have debated this issue intensely 
for decades and undoubtedly will continue to do so. Trakman 
and Gatien deserve praise for taking this jurisprudential debate 
seriously. They could have written a book simply venting frus-
tration about the loneliness of modem liberal society and extol-
ling the romantic virtues of community. They did not. They 
wrote a book that tackles the theoretical problem at the level of 
intellectual sophistication that it demands. In the end, however, 
their "transformational" strategy of recognizing "responsibili-
ties" is unsatisfying. If we are to make greater concessions to so-
cial interests by scaling back individual rights or by recognizing 
countervailing group rights, we should do so forthrightly. We 
should not mask the sacrifices with mystifying terminology or 
claim that "everybody wins" when in fact someone will always 
lose. 
22. The authors state, "[t]he benefit in protecting both individual and shared inter-
ests is the enhancement of liberty and of the common good." (p. 63) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (footnote omitted). 
